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Abstract: In exchange for loans from international financial institutions, natural resources
companies should be made contractually responsible for achieving specific primary health care
targets in certain developing countries they invest in. Primary health care is crucial for
social/economic development, but many developing countries’ governments fail in its provision.
Any effort to make natural resources companies responsible for primary health care would need
to focus on goal setting, monitoring and legal enforcement. The latter would include both
monetary sanctions and incentives tied to specific targets. The challenges facing this project are
significant, but none are problematic enough to prevent its implementation.
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Section I: Introduction
One of the vicious cycles facing developing countries is the interaction between their
poverty and inadequate primary health care systems that under-perform because of corruption,
inadequate resource allocation and other failures. The absence of primary health care in turn
contributes to sub-standard economic performance by reducing the effectiveness of the country’s
work force. These failures can also impact the broader international community—as diseases
jump borders and health failures in one country lead to epidemics in others.

Developing

countries’ sub-standard economic and primary health care performance extends to those
countries blessed with significant natural resource deposits, despite the significant revenues these
natural resources can generate. A key challenge for international financial institutions and the
broader development community is addressing this shortfall between the promise of natural
resource wealth and broader economic and social development. One way of doing this is more
closely linking natural resources investment and development of key social programs like
primary health care.
In recent years, the World Bank, IMF and other international financial institutions have
been experimenting with diverse programs that aim to stimulate economic growth in developing
nations.1 In creating these programs, international financial institutions have to grapple with
diverse priorities and special challenges. Some of the most important include: The importance
of social development (e.g. primary health care) to human and economic development;2
1

These types of projects can range from financing training for journalists, Paul Lewis, World Bank Emphasizes Role
of Free Media in Fighting Graft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, at 21, to coordinating efforts to get developed nation to
finance primary education in poorer countries, Elizabeth Becker, Meeting to Focus on Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2004, at C2, to helping pressure developing countries to reveal oil payments, Heather Timmons, Angola Set to
Disclose Payments From Big Oil, N.Y.TIMES, May 13, 2004, at W1.
2
See, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP, WORKING FOR A WORLD FREE OF POVERTY 3 (2003), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/wbgroupbrochure.pdf.
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continued, significant corruption and incompetence on the part of developing country
governments;3 and the critical role of natural resources in many developing country economies.4
Different programs have attempted, with varied success, to link these factors with the dynamism
that private industry often brings to its operations.5

This paper proposes extending these

experiments by explicitly linking the development of natural resources with improvements in
primary health care. In return for loan guarantees and assistance from international financial
institutions, private natural resource companies would be held legally responsible for meeting
particular criteria linked to social development. While developing country governments’ input
and approval would be essential to the plan, and it would include a variety of measures to
promote local ownership, the consequences of meeting or failing to meet these targets would be
born by the natural resource companies involved.
Making private sector corporations responsible for the promotion of a basic government
responsibility like primary health care is a radical step. It expresses a profound critique of many
developing countries’ governments’ abilities and honesty.

But the record of economic

development since decolonization has often been so dismal6 as to make this step worth
exploring, at least in the short run. In contrast to developing country governments, private sector
corporations are often extremely competent at efficiently using resources to achieve their ends.7
Tying private corporations’ profits to improvements in primary health care could lead to
3

See, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP, REFORMING PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE (2000)
[hereinafter Governance]; WORLD BANK GROUP, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION (1997) [hereinafter
Public Institutions].
4
See, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP, TREASURE OR TROUBLE? MINING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2002).
5
See, e.g., Paul Lewis, A New World Bank: Consultant to Third World Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1995, at D4.
6
For example: “Sub-Saharan Africa faces enormous poverty…(and) almost across the board the story is one of
stagnation…[e]conomies have not grown, half of Africans live in extreme poverty…and about one-sixth of children
die before age five—the same as a decade ago”. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003 at 37 (OUP 2003)
available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/hdr03_complete.pdf [hereinafter HDI Report].
7
See discussion in Section III C. This competence extends to the health sector. The government of Mozambique,
for example, increased vaccination coverage and prenatal consultations by 80% partially through the use of private
sector providers. See HDI Report, supra note 6, at 2.
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significant improvements in the both life expectancy and quality of life for local populations in
resource-rich developing nations. Health care in general and primary health care in particular
have been identified by numerous experts as a core requirement for both human and economic
development.8 It is an important component of the UNDP Human Development index and is
also a key requirement for promoting broader economic activity.9 Primary health care, while a
complex undertaking, is also relatively separated from certain cultural and nationalistic tensions
inherent in the private provision of other key social services, like education.10
Although placing significant responsibility for primary health care targets in the hands of
corporations is a radical concept, making them responsible for health care on a small scale is not.
Natural resources companies have significant experience in promoting social programs in
regions where they locate facilities and within their workforces.11 Both developing country
governments and international financial corporations have also experimented in making private
industry a catalyst for social change.12 In Chad, the World Bank made funding of an oil pipeline
contingent on allocation of oil revenues to particular areas of social development, with the

8

See, e.g., John Strauss & Duncan Thomas, Health, Nutrition and Economic Development, 36 JOURNAL OF
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 766 (1998); T. Paul Shultz, Health and Schooling Investments in Africa,13 JOURNAL OF
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 67 (1999); DEON FILMER ET. AL., HEALTH POLICY IN POOR COUNTRIES: WEAK LINKS IN
THE CHAIN (World Bank, Working Paper No. 1874, 1998) (“There is broad consensus that a mix of public health,
preventive and simple curative activities provided through low-level facilities is the right policy for public
expenditures on health in developing countries.”); DAVID E. BLOOM ET. AL., THE EFFECT OF HEALTH ON ECONOMIC
GROWTH: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8587, 2001); DESMOND
MCCARTHY ET. AL., THE GROWTH COSTS OF MALARIA 20 (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7541, 2000); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
9
See, e.g., Ravi Kanbur & Lyn Squire, The Evolution of Thinking About Poverty: Exploring the Interactions, in
FRONTIERS OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 183, 200-02 (Gerald M. Meier & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2001), Strauss,
supra note 8 at 768; MCCARTHY, supra note 8 at 20; Shultz, supra note 8 at 85; HDI Report, supra note 6.
10
Education almost inevitably includes a strong element of nationalism and nation building absent from primary
health care interventions—See, e.g., BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983).
11
Shell’s programs in the Niger Delta are an example of this, spending tens of millions of dollars on community
development—though this investment faces criticism and obstacles. See, e.g., Robert Lenzner, Damned if You Do,
FORBES, Nov. 27, 2000.
12
These experiments include multinational oil companies BP and Shell, examples of which are discussed in Section
IV.
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agreement of private sector participants and the government.13 In South Africa, the government
has legally compelled private corporations to participate in efforts to promote economic
development in its black population.14 While not always welcoming these programs, private
sector corporations have adapted to and accepted these efforts.15
This paper proposes that in return for loan guarantees from international financial
institutions, private sector corporations (almost certainly in the natural resources sector)
guarantee to meet a series of key performance targets in primary health care. Depending on their
success in meeting these targets, they would be either rewarded or penalized. Before any loans
were extended or projects begun, representatives of all interested parties, as well as civil society
groups would agree to the terms of any plan.

Any plan would include explicit stages

encompassing goal setting, monitoring and enforcement activities. Any plan for primary health
care promotion could exist alongside other commitments to regional development, payments to
the developing country government and other programs.
Section II of this paper places the proposal in the context of relevant legal and non-legal
literature and addresses some of the immediate normative considerations that challenge this
proposal.

Section III explores the context of this proposal—the importance of economic

development and primary health care, developing country governments’ poor record in
promoting these and the capabilities of private sector corporations. Section IV of the paper
explores in more detail previous experiments in encouraging private sector corporations to
support broader social goals.

The successes and challenges these efforts faced are key to

13

See generally, Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, To Lend or Not To Lend: Oil, Human Rights, and the World Bank's
Internal Contradictions, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 197 (2001); World Bank, The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum
Development and Pipeline Project: Question and Answers, Why is the Bank Group Involved?, at
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/questions [hereinafter World Bank, Questions and Answers].
14
See, e.g., Itumeleng Mahabane, On the Dating Scene, FINANCIAL MAIL, Apr. 30, 2004, at 60.
15
Id.
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understanding what types of innovations will be successful in new programs. Section V outlines
the proposal in detail, examining goal setting, monitoring and legal enforcement activities.
Section VI explores various legal and non-legal challenges the proposal will face, and explains
why they should not stop this proposal from being implemented. Section VII suggests next steps
and broader applications of the program discussed in Section V.

Section II: Existing Scholarship and Normative Considerations
a. Existing Scholarship
While there have been articles about spurring economic development in poorer countries,
no serious proposals have been made that would make natural resource companies responsible
for primary health care in the countries where operate. Instead, as discussed in the paragraphs
that follow, there have been general works discussing (and often criticizing) particular projects;
critiquing the current natural resource extraction processes; critiquing trade agreements and
international financial institutions for causing problems to developing countries; and
recommending increased control of natural resource revenues by the international community.
These proposals, though sometimes contradictory, often contain valuable commentary about the
problems facing developing nations. Potentially because of the normative problems sketched out
in the second part of this section however, they avoid giving additional responsibility to natural
resource companies.
The project most discussed by academics and in international development circles is the
Chad oil pipeline project.16 Discussed extensively in Section III, this project has been both
praised for its innovative attempt to make international financing contingent on socially
16

See, e.g., Uriz supra note 13; Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, The Application of the World Bank’s Standards to the
Oil Industry, 28 BROOKLY J. INT’L L. 77 (2002); Dana L. Clark, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: The
World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability, 1
5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205 (2002).
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beneficial use of oil revenues and criticized for specific instances where the Chadian government
either ignored or manipulated the control system it had agreed to. The World Bank and the IMF
have also been criticized for providing support to other projects that either led to significant
human rights abuses or led to corruption.17 But the Chad oil pipeline project has been their most
ambitious attempt to influence the use of natural resource revenues and has attracted the most
attention in recent years.
Both legal and non-legal authors have heavily criticized the current arrangements for
natural resources extraction and identified their negative impact on developing countries.18
These authors have commented on the frequent failure of countries with natural resources to
develop at appropriately high rates—and identified the high social cost this entails.19 Natural
resources have been linked to a wide range of problems, including corruption, power struggles,
wars and various additional problems.20 These pieces are often less focused on solving than on
pointing out particular problems with natural resource extraction. But when they do propose
solutions, these include more private control for natural resources,21 greater transparency in

17

See, e.g., Uriz, supra note 13.
See, e.g., Uriz, supra note 13, James C. Owens, Note, Government Failure in Sub-Saharan Africa: The
International Community’s Options, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1003 (2003); PAULINE JONES LUONG, RETHINKING THE
RESOURCE CURSE: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY (Yale Center for Int’l and Area Studies,
Working Paper, 2003) (“The proposition that abundant mineral resources…are more often a curse than a
blessing…is by now so familiar that it has become doctrine”); TERRY LYNN KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL
BOOMS AND PETRO-STATES (1997).
19
See, e.g., XAVIER SALA-I-MARTIN & ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN, ADDRESSING THE NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE: AN
EXAMPLE FROM NIGERIA (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9804, 2003); CARLOS LEITE &
JENS WEIDMANN, DOES MOTHER NATURE CORRUPT? NATURAL RESOURCES,
CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (IMF, Working paper WP/99/85, 1999); JEFFREY D. SACHS & ANDREW M.
WARNER, NATURAL RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (National Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 5398, 1995).
20
See, e.g., GLOBAL WITNESS, TIME FOR TRANSPARENCY 2-7 (2004), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/
reports/show.php/en.00049.html; Leite, supra note 17; Sachs, supra note 17.
21
See, e.g., Luong supra note 18.
18
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transfers between natural resource companies and governments22 and additional international
control of developing country resources.23
From the left wing of academia, commentary on development focuses on the social
misery and neo-colonial24 implications of international agreements on issues like trade and
restrictions on budget spending by international lenders like the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Authors adopting this perspective specifically criticize
“adjustment” and “investment” programs by international financial institutions for leading to
human rights abuses, for limiting the sovereignty of developing country governments, and for
causing social misery among the poor.25 These pieces also advocate initiatives like an increased
focus on social welfare and legal rights when making loans and grants to developing nations26 as
well as questioning the very idea of whether development as currently conceptualized is
necessary or appropriate.27
A more coercive genre of scholarly work on developing countries acknowledges the
manifest failures of developing country governments and recommends more coercive solutions
to the problems facing developing nations. These types of solutions include more international

22

See, e.g., GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 20, at 79-95.
See, e.g., Owens, supra note 18, at 1033-49; For a more personal view and discussion see Jon H. Sylvester, SubSaharan Africa: Economic Stagnation, Political Disintegration, and the Specter of Recolonization, 27 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1299 (1994).
24
See, e.g., Theophilus Fuseini Maranga, The Colonial Legacy and the African Common Market: Problems and
Challenges Facing the African Economic Community 10 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 105 (1993); Ruth E. Gordon and
Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22 WIS. INT’L L. J. 1 (2004); Tayaab Mahmud, Postcolonial
Imaginaries: Alternative Development or Alternatives to Development 9T RANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29
(1999); Charles R. P. Pouncy, Stock Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: Western Legal Institutions as a Component of
the Neo-Colonial Project 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 85 (2002).
25
See, e.g., Rajesh Swaminathan, Note, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment and the Case for National
Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 161, 181-89, 195-97 (1998); Jonathan
Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority? The World Bank and the Democratization of Development 6 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 159, 160-61 (1993).
26
See, e.g., Swaminathan, supra note 25, at 209-12.
27
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 24.
23

9

control of natural resources revenues,28 using debt relief as a way to achieve desired reforms29
and increased focus on non-governmental civil society partners in economic development.30
Even though these recommendations are not shy about discussing potentially coercive measures,
they hesitate to recommend that natural resource companies be given responsibility for important
social functions like primary health care. As discussed in more detail in sections III and IV, this
timidity ignores the fact that natural resource extraction companies possess unparalleled
knowledge, influence and even social welfare know-how in developing countries. The most
likely reasons for this refusal to make the link are a number of normative concerns explored in
the second part of this section.
A second set of literature discusses making nations and private companies liable for legal
action outside their country of origin. The literature shows increasing theoretical acceptance and
practical proposals for persecuting those responsible for human rights abuses,31 as well as
litigating disagreements over investment disputes.32 There is also some discussion of actually
enforcing economic and social rights in court,33 but these efforts are considerably less advanced.
Individual governments and even firms can potentially be sued in national courts for human
rights abuses, and are often liable to international arbitration proceedings when investments do
28

See, e.g., Owens, supra note 18, at 1033-49.
See, Eric A. Friedman, New Development, Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step in a Long Journey 3 YALE H.R. &
DEV. L. J. 191, 198-200 (2000).
30
See, e.g., Richard Cameron Blake, New Development, The World Bank’s Draft Comprehensive Development
Framework and the Micro-Paradigm of Law and Development, 3 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 159 (2000).
31
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991); Anne-Marie
Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff's Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 102 (2000); Eric Marcks, Avoiding Liability for
Human Rights Violations in Project Finance, 22 ENERGY L. J. 301 (2001) (discussing the liability of corporations in
US courts for human rights violations associated with their operations abroad);
32
In this case, international arbitration is increasingly preferred as a means of solving disputes, and required by the
relevant contracts. See, e.g., Dinesh D. Banani, Note, International Arbitration and Project Finance in Developing
Countries: Blurring the Public/Private Distinction, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 355, 361-63 (2003). For a
pessimistic view on its effectiveness in this role, see Amr. A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea
for Reasessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INTL. L. J. 419 (2000).
33
See, e.g., Michael J. Dennis and David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Should
There be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing and Health?,
98 A.J.I.L. 462 (2004).
29
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not proceed as planned. But governments are much less liable to international legal sanction for
misusing the money they gain from these projects.
b. Normative Concerns
Making private sector natural resource companies responsible for the provision of
primary health care carries significant costs, even if accomplished with the acquiescence of all
concerned parties. As outlined in the paragraphs below, there are significant risks that removing
spending power from developing country governments could decrease the ability of often-weak
central governments to exert control and command respect from the general population. There
are also significant concerns about the democratic legitimacy of private sector companies when
providing an essential public service. Less theoretically, there is the concern that private sector
providers of essential services may put profits over principle and shortchange affected
populations. Finally, some commentators have expressed fear of the consequences of creeping
privatization. Despite the validity of these concerns, this paper will argue that there are ways to
decrease these risks, and that the crisis in the proper use of natural resource revenues and in the
provision of primary health care renders any remaining costs acceptable.
The most basic challenge to the idea of making natural resources companies responsible
for primary health care provision is whether the benefits of any improvements in primary health
care are worth the inevitable weakening of developing country governments’ authority.
Developing country governments often have weak governance structures in the first place,34 and
removing their ability to distribute patronage and provide citizens’ with basic services like
primary health care could significantly reduce national unity as well as the government’s ability
to achieve any other goals—at least some of which the international community supports.

34

See, e.g., Public Institutions supra note 3, at xi.
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This basic challenge to removing primary health care functions from national
governments addresses the very heart of this project’s rationale. At a fundamental level, this
project assumes that most developing country governments are so corrupt and incompetent at
providing key social services like primary health care that weakening their authority will have
only a limited negative impact on the general population. It also assumes that primary health
care is extremely significant for social and economic development and that natural resource
companies will achieve real improvements in its provision.
Unfortunately, the record of many developing countries in the provision of all social
services, including primary health care, is so poor as to justify weakening their authority.35 More
broadly, somewhat competent governments will probably cooperate with natural resource
companies, who will have a financial incentive to promote and even fund existing government
programs when these are already efficient.

These incentives will support the authority of

competent governments and undermine that of governments whose service provision is
inefficient and corrupt. Primary health care is also so important36 that significant improvements
in its provision seems worth some weakening of central authority—especially when this
weakening is only a possibility, not a certainty. Primary health care is also not a key component
of national identity and values—at least not to the same extent as educational services, another
key component of social/economic development. Finally, the private sector’s record in the
developing world suggests a real ability to produce results,37 especially when these are necessary

35

Obviously where the line should be drawn with regards to justifying removal of authority differs depending on the
commentator. This note will not spend a lot of time articulating a definite line—it suffices to agree that there are
some countries which do fall into this category. Chad, discussed in Section IV, would be one country that outside
institutions like the World Bank have deemed worthy of additional restrictions.
36
See, e.g., Strauss supra note 8, Filmer supra note 8, Shultz supra note 8.
37
See discussion is sub-section III c.
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to produce profits. Given these facts, the tradeoff between government authority and provision
of primary health care seems acceptable.
Beyond the impact of this project on central governments, there are also legitimate
concerns about the appropriateness of having natural resources companies be responsible for
primary health care provision. In particular, making a private sector corporation responsible for
this basic service raises the questions of whether it is sufficiently democratically accountable,38
whether the natural resource companies will be tempted to deliver substandard health care in
order to increase corporate profits, and whether this “privatization” of primary health care would
be the precursor to the outsourcing of many other basic government services.
The most effective way of addressing concerns about democratic accountability lies in
structuring a project that allows significant local commentary and input about the work
accomplished by the natural resource company. It is true that developing country citizens rarely
have any voice in the decisions of natural resource companies’ management or shareholders,
given their relative poverty and absence from senior managerial ranks.39

But Section V

describes a number of key aspects to this proposal--specifically “goal setting”, “monitoring” and
“enforcement”—that involve important roles for local civil society organizations as well as
substantial oversight of the work accomplished by this project. In a final analysis, a government
would also retain the right to stop the entire project from continuing—if it was willing to bear the
impact of international finance companies recalling loans and/or the natural resource company
withdrawal from its territory. Beyond these basic safeguards, there is also a comparative point—

38

See,e.g., Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003); John Tagliabue,
As Multinationals Run the Taps, Anger Rises Over Water for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at A1.
39
For example in BP, a major oil company, only 18% of staff in Global Leadership positions were from outside the
US or UK in 2003, despite the company’s extensive global operations. This was, however, an improvement from
2002 when the percentage was 16%. See, BP, Diversity at
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2011555&contentId=2016939.
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that developing country citizens often have very little say over their natural resources even today.
A large number of resource rich, impoverished nations are governed by autocratic governments
which give their citizens very little voice in the operation of these projects.40 In these cases,
outside interference in the allocation of oil revenues might make the spending more, not less
accountable.
A second concern about assigning natural resource companies specific targets involves
their priority on making profits rather than improving health care. It is certainly true that
charitable work is not the main goal of these companies. But again, the plan outlined in Section
V includes a lengthy discussion of incentive planning and output monitoring, along with legal
enforcement, which should align companies’ profits with achieving primary health targets set in
cooperation with governments, international financial institutions, and civil society members.
Additionally, given the corruption and inefficiency discussed in Section III, even if natural
resource companies spend a significantly lower amount than governments currently budget, they
may do a better job providing primary health care, provided that the spending actually reaches
communities rather than being wasted or stolen.
A final normative objection to assigning natural resource companies responsibility for
provision of primary health care is the fear that this will begin an inevitable slippery slope
process involving the privatization of major government functions. This is certainly possible,
especially if primary health care provision improves as a result of this initiative. Of course,
additional privatization in response to improved services would not necessarily be a bad thing—
and could improve other developing country services as well.

It could be that a mass

privatization of key functions could precipitate problems like government weakness in the way
40

Out of the countries ranked as “Low Human Development” by the UNDP, only four score as “Free” on Freedom
House’s annual ranking. See HDI Report, supra note 6 at 237-41, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004
at 243-44 (2004), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/ freeworld/2004/table2004.pdf.
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that a single plan like the one advocated here would not. But the balancing act required for these
decisions is not the responsibility of those advocating this proposal—and should be left for
potential future debate.

Section III: Context
The failure of many developing country governments to provide primary health care
services compares unfavorably with private sector corporations’ success in managing complex
operations in these same countries.

This observation is a key motivation for transferring

responsibility for primary health care development to private companies. Managing primary
health care is a complex enterprise, but private sector corporations have frequently proved able
to address challenges of equal complexity.

The largest private sector investors in most

developing nations are those developing natural resources. They have extensive experience with
large scale projects and unusual influence with their host governments. These private sector
corporations are thus the ideal partners in any plan to make the private sector responsible for
meeting primary health care expansion goals. This section will explain why primary health care
is such an important government service, trace the corruption and inefficiency which currently
plague many resource rich developing countries, point to the special capabilities of private sector
corporations in developing countries and highlight the key role of natural resource investments in
these same countries. This will provide an appropriate context for considering the role that
private sector natural resource companies can play in delivering primary health care in
developing countries.

a. Importance of primary health care

15

Expansion of primary health care is crucial for most developing countries. The health of
a country’s people is vital to their overall well being and is also important in assuring economic
development. Primary health projects in particular target the poorest of citizens with the most
cost-efficient services—improving basic indicators of national health like maternal and infant
mortality. Primary health care usually does not produce prestige projects—like major hospitals
that donors and governments can showcase. It often gets ignored for this reason. International
development institutions have recognized the importance of primary health care to overall
wellbeing of the general population.
Three of the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) eight millennium goals
focus on issues related to primary health care.41

Fully one third of the UNDP’s Human

Development Index (HDI) is based on life expectancy at birth, a statistic closely related to
primary health care availability.42 More broadly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
academic analyses have suggested that good quality primary health care which benefits the poor
is highly correlated to better health outcomes and higher per capita income.43
Primary health care projects are particularly beneficial to social development because
they usually address basic health problems faced by the very poor. These basic health problems
can often be addressed at relatively low cost by simple preventative and treatment measures.
Campaigns to expand vaccination, prompt prevention and treatment for diseases like malaria and
other relatively cheap measures can yield significant improvements to overall population health

41

Three of the eight major millennium goals set by the UNDP are directly related to primary health care—reducing
infant and maternal mortality and combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases. Metrics used to calculate this include
the number of deaths in childbirth, infant mortality at ages one and five and inoculation rates. HDI Report, supra
note 6, at 15-16, 220-21.
42
Id., at 349.
43
See, e.g., DAVOODI, HAMID R. ET AL., HOW USEFUL ARE BENEFIT INCIDENCE ANALYSES OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
AND HEALTH SPENDING (IMF 2003); Strauss, supra note 8, at 767-68.
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and consequently to economic development.44 Richer, more influential populations often face
health challenges that are more complex an expensive, like cancer, heart problems and the like.
While addressing these challenges is important, addressing primary health care needs generally
results in the most benefit to the most people.45
Certain developing country governments focus on prestige health care projects that do not
cost-effectively address primary health care challenges.

Researchers have documented a

tendency to focus on items like expensive new hospitals and equipment for dealing with
complicated diseases prestige at the expense of primary health care.46 These types of high-tech
initiatives address local elites’ health concerns more directly than expanded primary care, which
targets the very poor.47 In many less developed nations, “[i]t is safe to say that targeting health
spending to the poor…would require spending less on hospitals and more on primary care
facilities.”48
b. Corruption, Inefficiency and Developing Countries
Even resources that are devoted to basic health and education are often wasted and stolen
by corrupt and incompetent bureaucracies. Corruption in particular can mean that even resources
that are officially devoted to sectors like health care are actually allocated to private
consumption. Numerous studies have suggested that corruption is a particular problem in many
lesser developed countries. Incompetence can also sabotage spending on programs like primary
care. Government bureaucracies, particularly in lesser developed countries, are often dominated
by staff whose appointments depend on political patronage rather than competence. Especially
44

See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 8 at 25.
See FILMER, supra note 8 at 3, 3 n.3.
46
Id. at 2; see also F. Castro Leal et al., Public Spending on Health in Africa: Do the Poor Benefit?, 78 BULL. OF
THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 66 (2000).
47
Studies on a number of African countries showed that health care resources were concentrated on the tertiary
rather than the primary level, and that health care subsidies provided significantly more benefits to the richest 20%
of the population than to the 20% poorest. Id. at 68-69.
48
Id. at 69.
45
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in fields that do require technical expertise, like primary health care, having political appointees
make key decisions can lead to inefficient allocation of resources.
Corruption has been identified as a major obstacle to economic development.49 Though it
takes numerous forms (ranging from enormous kickbacks in contract bidding to low level
payoffs for policemen and others) its overall impact is almost always considered damaging for
any economy.50 Corruption also seems particularly endemic to the state sector. Civil servants’
salaries are often relatively low, making them particularly susceptible to bribes when allocating
government benefits. This type of corruption is particularly endemic to developing countries and
exists even in relatively low profile sectors like primary health care.51
Developing countries are particularly susceptible to corruption.52

Significant

opportunities exist allowing corruption—often including high monopoly rents, great discretion
for public officials, significant portions of the economy in the hands of the government and poor
accountability.

The combination of these factors, alongside the great poverty of many

developing nations, means that both that those susceptible to corruption are presented with both
motivation and opportunity.53
Some of the most corrupt developing countries (and, ironically, some of the least
developed as well) are those relying on natural resources for all funding—like oil and diamonds

49

See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2002 302-03 (2003) [hereinafter
CORRUPTION].
50
See, e.g., Klitgaard, Subverting Corruption, 37 FIN. & DEV. 2 (2000); Robert Klitgaard, Combating Corruption,
UN CHRON., 90, March 22, 1998 (discussing how different levels of corruption are associated with different levels
of harm); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 2
(1999).
51
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 45, at 71-84; Sanjeev Gupta et al., Corruption and the Provision of Health Care
and Education Services, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION 111 (Arvind K. Jain ed., 2001).
52
See id., at 1-3. All of the countries classified by the UNDP as having “low human development” based on their
HDI scores that were included in Tranparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked in the bottom
half. See CORRUPTION, supra note 49, at 302-03; HDI Report, supra note 6, at 243-44.
53
See, e.g., Cheryl W. Gray and Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and Development, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT,
March 1998, at 7.
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in Angola.54 In these countries, society sometimes becomes wholly focused on the wealth
generated by natural resources. The absence of other types of private sector activity means that
government revenues are even more central to private individuals’ wealth creation plans.55
The provision of health care is usually a significant expenditure for developing country
governments and is thus subject to pressures from private individuals willing to steal/misuse
public funds.56 While primary health care expenditures do not usually include major projects
like large hospitals—with the inevitable opportunities for corrupt bidding and other income
diversion schemes that these bring—the diffuse nature of this type of expenditure inevitably
makes central monitoring harder.

The large number of localities that need services like

clinics/vaccinations increases the number of expenditures and also increases the number of
individuals with access to government funds.57 The diffuse nature of this spending provides
many more opportunities for corruption. In the aggregate, small thefts of primary health funds
can significantly constrict activities undertaken.58
Government funded primary health care also suffers from other inefficient practices. In
particular, political patronage and nepotism often help determine staff allocation to government
programs, especially in countries where government expenditure plays a significant role in the
54

Nigeria for example is ranked 101 out of 102 in Tranparency International’s Corruption Perception Index,
CORRUPTION, supra note 49 at 302-03. At the same time, the Nigerian government derives 65% of its budget
revenues from oil. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK 2003 (2003), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html. See also, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOME
TRANSPARENCY, NO ACCOUNTABILITY: THE USE OF OIL REVENUE IN ANGOLA AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(2004) available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/angola0104/. [hereinafter Transparency].
55
See generally THORVALDUR GYLAFSON, GYLFI ZOEGA, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE
ROLE OF INVESTMENT 8-10 (Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper No. 142 2002).
56
Though it can often be below the level considered necessary by NGOs/IOs, it is still a significant expenditure.
57
For example, usage surveys show that theft of government provided medicines is a significant problem in many
developing countries. Gupta, supra note 51 at 118.
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expenditures. A survey of schools showed they received only 13% of the grants with much of the school grant
“captured” by local officials. See Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, Local Capture: Evidence from a Central
Government Transfer Program in Uganda 679 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 119 (2004). See also Gupta,
supra note 51.
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economy.59

Primary health care, with its diffuse hiring practices and need for local

representatives is particularly accommodating to political interference in which relatives/clients
of politicians and government officials are placed in appointed positions. Especially when
combined with actual theft, this type of practice can significantly undermine the effectiveness of
primary health care investments channeled through the government. In general, corruption and
poor governance structures are often endemic in government funded activities carried out in
developing countries.60 Government provided primary health care is not magically exempt from
these problems.
c. Special Skills of the Private Sector
The private sector in underdeveloped countries possesses special skills that often surpass
those of government actors. In particular, various private sector companies are able to operate in
remote locations within developing countries in a way that maintains profitability and a
competitive return on equity to investors. Additionally, the private sector has demonstrated an
ability to provide health care and other services to particular groups within underdeveloped
countries—their employees and the communities in which their facilities are based.
While many underdeveloped countries have a relatively small private sector, almost all of
them have a number of private international sector actors who are able to make profits. These
include consumer product, communication and above all natural resource extraction companies
that earn significant profits in developing countries.61

These companies are able to adjust to
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This is particularly probable when natural resource wealth is a major or overwhelming presence in the economy.
For more discussion on the broader probability and effects of corruption, see GYLAFSON, supra note 16.
60
See, e.g., Governance, supra note 3; Public Institutions, supra note 3.
61
Examples include: Celtel, with headquarters in the Netherlands and telecom operations in 13 African countries
and profits in 2003 of $74 million on revenues of $446 million, see Marina Bidoli, Loudest Ring on the Continent,
FINANCIAL MAIL, Jun. 4, 2004, at 44; BP announced that Angola would be one of its five “profit centers”, see BP
Reaffirms Focus on Core Areas to Drive Upstream Growth, INTERNATIONAL OIL DAILY, Jun. 9, 2004.; Guinness
distributes more beer in Africa than in the UK with its Nigerian operations alone making a profit of $71 million in
2003, see Ciaran Hancock, Sales of Guinness Grow Stout in Africa, SUNDAY TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, Business 1.
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numerous logistical obstacles—poor transportation and communication networks, frequent
power outages and the like—and produce profits that satisfy shareholders.62
Private sector actors also operate throughout developing countries—not just in national
capitals. Consumer products companies, for example, distribute goods like beer throughout
many underdeveloped countries.63 Natural resource companies in particular have no choice but
to explore and extract resources where they occur—often in very rural areas far from traditional
transportation and communication links--and they innovate relatively low-cost techniques for
communicating with and transporting goods to whatever remote areas where they operate.64
Faced with the inability of governments in developing countries to provide adequate
social services, private sector actors in many developing countries are also accustomed to
providing additional services to key population segments.

For example, natural resource

companies often provide their employees with health care and other goods/services needed to
maintain an acceptable quality of life (especially for western expatriate personnel…). Similarly,
natural resource companies often invest in the areas where their facilities are located, providing
support for services like education and health care.65
Private sector actors have a long tradition of providing services like health care to their
employees.

In South Africa for example, mining companies provided retroviral drugs to

employees carrying the HIV virus before the government agreed to do this for the general
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For publicly held private corporations, like major natural resources and consumer products companies,
shareholder pressure will generally ensure that operations not generating sufficient profit are ended.
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The Road to Hell is-Unpaved, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 2002 [hereinafter Beer].
64
See, e.g., Nick Selby, Growth (with challenges) for the satellite services industry, INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE, Oct. 13, 2003, at 10.
65
See, e.g., ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL GROUP, MEETING THE ENERGY CHALLENGE: THE SHELL REPORT 2002 at 38
(2002), available at http://www.shell.com/html/investor-en/reports2002/doc/pdf/sr_full.pdf. [hereinafter SHELL
REPORT]. In Nigeria for example, Shell supported 29 permanent medical facilities treating 135,000 people in 2003.
See, SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA LTD, 2003 PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2003)
[hereinafter Shell Nigeria].
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population.66

Even beyond the example of HIV, natural resource companies in particular

provide health care services to key parts of their workforce in developing countries.67 As private
companies, they have a vested interest in finding health care providers who can provide services
at the highest quality for the lowest cost.
Private corporations also have experience supporting the provision of health care and
other social services to specific communities in developing countries.

Multinational oil

companies, for example, often decide to invest resources in communities that they locate
extraction/exploration facilities in.68 The type of health care initiatives supported are often those
most appropriate to poorer areas—e.g. primary health care.
d. Resource Flows to Developing Countries
Private sector foreign investment in developing countries is heavily focused on natural
resources.69 These investments often turn into large scale enterprises that involve significant
commitments of funds and significant involvement with the governments concerned.
The significant investments required for natural resource development projects usually
force the companies that make these investments to interact heavily with the countries in which
they operate. Especially in sectors like petroleum, where investments can cost billions of dollars,
natural resource companies cooperate with local government, private sector and civil society
66

See, e.g., Peter Clarke, City View: Mining a Noble Seam, EVENING NEWS (Edinburgh), Aug. 7, 2002 at 2.
See, e.g., SHELL REPORT, supra note 65, at 32.
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See, e.g., id. at 36.
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actors in order to assure the security of their investments.70 This kind of interaction provides
natural resource companies with a rich knowledge base about how to operate successfully within
the particular political, economic and social context of the country in which they invest.71 This
knowledge, along with efficient business practices, allows natural resource companies to achieve
their goals more effectively than most other actors.72
The fact that developing country governments often rely on natural resource revenues for
a substantial proportion of their budgets makes them particularly responsive to requests by these
companies.73 While both companies and governments need the other party, multinational natural
resource companies often have much more flexibility when choosing projects than do national
governments, which are constrained by their geography and poverty.

As a result, natural

resource companies are justifiably assumed to wield great influence on the policies of developing
country governments.74
Natural resource companies’ significant influence in developing countries is not matched
by any other private sector actor. Efforts to promote primary health care initiatives (and many
other social programs) need to acknowledge these companies’ prominence and use the resources
they manipulate to achieve their goals. Their local knowledge and economic influence over
developing world governments and civil society institutions is unmatched.

International

financial institutions are increasingly recognizing that the social/political goals which they
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See, e.g., See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL (1999), available at
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in.
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pursue require the cooperation and support of large investors in developing countries—the
natural resource companies.75
Section IV: Attempting to Mobilize the Private Sector in Developing Countries
a. Introduction
There have been significant and sometimes successful attempts to make the private sector
a partner in achieving social change/improvement in developing countries. These efforts have
relied on different means, including publicity, legal sanctions, incentive schemes and other tools.
But though there are examples of private sector companies possessing and sometimes realizing
the capability to play integral roles in social programs of developing countries, attempts to
harness the private sector to achieve change have often faced obstacles. One example of efforts
to influence corporations is provided by NGOs’ publicity campaigns against Talisman Energy in
Sudan. Another is a World Bank effort to ensure that the government of Chad uses its oil
revenues in ways that directly benefit its general population, rather than diverting these funds to
uses with less broad social utility. Though both these examples showcase problematic projects,
they also underscore attributes that could prove key to successfully mobilizing the private sector:
working cooperatively with the private sector and deemphasizing national government
participation in projects.
b. Involving the Private Sector in Social Change
1. Case Study on the Talisman Energy Experience
One cautionary example of corporate interactions with social goals is the campaign against
Talisman Energy in Sudan. Talisman Energy’s operations were associated with significant
human rights abuses and were perceived as not contributing to its surrounding community. NGO
pressure on Talisman led it to leave Sudan—ending its association with human rights abuses.
75

See discussion of Chad oil project in Section III for an example of these efforts.
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But Talisman was replaced by an Indian oil firm less vulnerable to NGO pressure. NGOs
decision to push for disinvestment and attack Talisman—rather than work with it to improve
conditions in Sudan—ironically led to a situation where the international community ended up
with much less leverage to lobby for improved social policies. This case study underscores the
importance of calibrating pressure to ensure that private sector responses improve conditions in
developing countries.
Talisman Energy’s operations in Sudan were a major source of support for the Sudanese
government.76 Efforts to ensure that oil operations in southern operations in Southern Sudan
were not disrupted included killings, bombings and other human rights abuses.77 Revenues from
these oil investments were primarily used for military spending.78 While the company engaged
in social development programs79, NGOs and other groups harshly criticized the company’s
operations in Sudan. As part of a campaign to promote disinvestment, they launching lawsuits,80
issued hostile media attacks,81 and initiated shareholder actions.82 As a result, Talisman decided
to sell its stake in Sudanese oil operations.83
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See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Oil Companies Complicit in Rights Abuses (Nov. 25,
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See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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Talisman’s decision to divest of its Sudanese operations actually decreased the leverage
possessed by the international community. Oil investments were sold to an Indian petroleum
company84 that is significantly less vulnerable to western public pressure and thus less motivated
to pursue even minimal social/human rights programs than the Canadian owned Talisman.85 The
large scale campaign against Talisman Energy, while emotionally satisfying, did not improve the
situation in Sudan—it simply led to changes in ownership, which even supporters of the
campaign against Talisman saw as unhelpful.86

This cautionary example illustrates the

importance of working with corporate entities—and the limits of pressure that can be brought
onto them. Western natural resource companies are often much more amenable to pressure than
developing country governments or corporations.87 But efforts to influence them need to take
into account their profit making goals—and desire to preserve their corporate reputations—by
providing intermediate options that allow them to maintain profitability. Otherwise, they may
follow the example of Talisman and decide to divest controversial assets to actors less
susceptible to outside pressure.
2. Case Study on the Chad Oil Pipeline Project
One of the most ambitious efforts to involve the private sector in delivering social
benefits to developing nations has been the World Bank funded Chad oil pipeline project. The
World Bank made its funding of this oil pipeline contingent on the government of Chad and the
oil companies’ agreement that revenues from the project would be allocated by a Board with
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representatives of all parties according to pre-determined criteria. This was supposed to prevent
the government of Chad from misusing the funds it was allocated. The project achieved some
notable successes—however, the income allocation encountered significant problems, leading to
the suspension of World Bank funding. While these problems are due to a variety of factors, the
difficulties in controlling a sovereign government has been a particularly significant.
The Chad oil pipeline project was advertised by the World Bank as a new prototype in its
poverty alleviation strategy.88 The project consists of developing three oilfields (Miandoum,
Kome and Bolobo) in the Doba basin of southern Chad, and building a pipeline to export the oil
through Cameroon to the Atlantic ocean.89 The oil consortium that initially developed this
proposal (led by ExxonMobil and initially including Chevron and Petronas) was unwilling to
invest unless it could obtain World Bank loan guarantees.90 These were crucial to lowering the
overall financing costs of investing in a very unstable region.91
The World Bank was wary about providing loan guarantees to the project.

The

government of Chad had a very poor human rights record and was also known for diverting
funds away from social programs towards spending categories not perceived as beneficial to
Chad’s people.92 But in return for significant concessions to its budget allocation preferences,
the World Bank agreed to provide financing to both the governments of Chad and Cameroon and
the private sector consortium, through the International Bank for Reconstruction and
88

Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Represents New Approach, DEVNEWS MEDIA CENTER, Oct. 10, 2003, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20131848%7
EmenuPK:34460%7EpagePK:64003015%7EpiPK:64003012%7EtheSitePK:4607,00.html.
89
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See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CHAD: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 1999, Feb. 2,
2000, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/234.htm [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 1999], Uriz, supra note 13, at 218-19.
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Development (IBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) respectively.

Total

funding by these organizations was about $192.9 million, with some assistance in raising
additional amounts also offered.93
The most innovative conditions for the World Bank’s support involved the use of
revenues from the project. Chad’s government was entitled to compensation amounting to at
least 12.5% of the price of crude oil produced by the project (and potentially additional taxes).94
But before the World Bank was willing to approve the project, it required that Chad’s
government pass a Revenue Management Law, outlining socially beneficial use of the income
generated. This law required that direct revenues be deposited into an escrow account. Ten
percent of these revenues are supposed to be saved “for future generations”, Seventy two percent
spent on priority sectors (e.g. public health, social affairs, education etc.), 4.5% spent on the
people of the Doba basin and the rest allocated to the government operating expenses.95 The
disbursement of these funds is supposed to be controlled by an Oil Revenues Control and
Monitoring Board, which includes representatives from the judiciary, government and civil
society.96
Theoretically, the revenue management structure approved by the World Bank
considerably lessened the ability of Chad’s government to redirect funds in ways that do not
benefit the general population of the country. But the structure of the board actually made it easy
for the government of Chad to use the funds in ways that were not socially optimal. The Oil
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Revenues Control and Monitoring Board’s makeup was obviously subject to manipulation.97
While it is meant to have a mix of government and independent representatives, the Board was
actually composed of two Members of Parliament, four high ranking officials and two civil
society representatives.98

Given the undemocratic reality of Chad, this meant government

control of allocations with few opportunities to appeal. An International Advisory Group (IAG),
set up to help maintain the Board’s independence has the power to point out problems but limited
enforcement means. But the allocation of funds was still in the hands of Chad’s government—
subject to the corruption and incompetent allocation.
An additional problem with the revenue control board is that there are almost no limits on
how money allocated to particular social categories is actually spent. Thus there are no legal
limitations on preferential allocation of funds to certain regions (e.g. those where the president
derives his support) or on the type of projects that are actually funded. This led to the potential
for massive corruption and nepotism. The Chadian government’s past record did not suggest it
will make special efforts to ensure that the money is well spent. In fact, the international
monitoring of initial allocations rather than impact of spending provided strong incentives to the
Chadian government to divert funds at lower levels towards measures that directly support its
political and other goals. Animosity between northern and southern regions of Chad, with the
north dominating politics99 and the south producing oil, mades government control of the social
spending even more problematic.
The Chadian government’s actions on receiving its “welcome bonus” did not suggest that
it intended to respect the Revenue Management Law. The government spent half of the $25m
(spell out) it received without using the allocation mechanism required the law. Even more
97
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troublingly, $4.5m (spell out) of this amount was spent on arms, not one of the socially optimal
categories envisioned by its agreement with the World Bank.100 While public outcry and World
Bank intervention stopped this particular derogation by the Chadian government, it demonstrated
the ability of Chad’s government—and developing countries in general--to ignore national
legislation. Chad, in particular, decided to abrograte its agreement and increase spending on its
military, leading to the suspension of World Bank loans in early 2006.101 The future of the oil
project was unclear.
Despite the manifest and clear weaknesses of its revenue allocation plan, the Chad oil
pipeline project’s requirements were groundbreaking.

The Chadian government and the

multinational oil companies involved accepted an intrusive and detailed revenue allocation
arrangement once they realized that initial, vaguer plans were not acceptable to the World
Bank.102 In return for a relatively small scale loan, the World Bank achieved a much higher level
of monitoring than would traditionally have been acceptable for a sovereign government. The
Achilles heal of the project turned out to be the difficulties the World Bank faced in controlling
the activities of a sovereign government, even after it agreed to monitoring.
c.Extending Private Sector Involvement in the Provision of Social Services
Given private companies’ profit making focus, their willingness to adapt to changing
profit making incentives is not surprising. Western multinational natural resources corporations,
with international reputations and asset holdings, are also vulnerable to concerted pressure by
NGOs and governments.

Similarly, international financial institutions and even large
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international NGOs also have reputational concerns and are vulnerable to regulation by the
international community. In contrast, national governments like Chad’s, with few assets and a
problematic global reputation to begin with, have little to lose from global condemnation and are
thus able to more easily flout their international obligations.103 The independence enjoyed by
national governments also means that it is much harder to prevent them from abrogating
agreements, as the government of Chad’s eventual actions in the Pipeline project demonstrated.
These facts suggest that the next step in promoting critical emergency social
programs/economic development may involve less engagement with national governments.
Especially when dealing with governments like Chad’s, that consistently violate international
community norms on issues ranging from corruption to human rights,104 it may be necessary to
limit their participation in spending of funds in order to assure that revenue allocation programs
are successful.

Instead, groups composed of multinational companies, civil society

representatives and international financial institutions may be most effective in promoting social
and economic development. Their international reputations and asset bases make them more
vulnerable to international sanction, and thus more likely to follow through with their
commitments. For example, private corporations are relatively vulnerable to enforcement of
international arbitration decisions.

Large natural resource companies possess far-flung

international holdings105 that could be vulnerable in the event that they were assessed penalties
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On a broader scale, the pressure Chad comes under to improve human rights may not be that great in any case.
Oona Hathaway, writing about human rights law but in comments relevant to this case, has commented that “a
nation’s actions against its own citizens do not directly threaten or harm other states…[thus] countries have little
incentive to police noncompliance with treaties or norms.” Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1938 (2002).
104
See, e.g., PRICE OF OIL, supra note 70; Uriz, supra note 13, at 219-20.
105
See, e.g., ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM COMPANY, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2003 at 22 (2004) (listing
diverse countries where new investments are being made and operations are continuing—these include Germany,
the United States and Mexico).
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for not meeting pre-agreed primary health care targets.106 Beyond the slightly hazy idea of
reputation integrity, the real possibility that national legal systems will enforce contracts and
international arbitration makes natural resources companies more reliable interlocutors than
developing country governments with very limited assets abroad.107
In the past, national sovereignty concerns and suspicion of multinationals’ intentions
might have torpedoed efforts to expand the role of private companies at the expense of national
governments. But the poor record of developing country governments in respecting the rights of
their peoples, the same governments’ abandonment of traditional national sovereignty concerns
in order to attract investment and the expanding role of private corporations suggests that it will
be possible to make private corporations responsible not just for producing revenues efficiently
but also allocating at least some of them in a fairer and more productive manner.
Section V: Proposal
a. Introduction
The inability of many developing country governments to provide primary health care to
their citizens suggests that radical change is needed in the way that these services are allocated
and funded.

Making natural resource companies that invest in developing countries

contractually responsible for the provision of at least some of these services would yield
significant benefits. With the establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework, this type of
arrangement would leverage these companies’ ability to operate efficiently, their influence with
developing country governments, and their susceptibility to outside monitoring and pressure.
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International arbitration rulings are increasingly being enforced in national courts. See, e.g., Jane L. Volz &
Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral Awards: Enforcing the Award Against the Recalcitrant Loser, 21 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 867 (1996).
107
The tragicomic saga of a Ukrainian government plane being seized in a dispute with a private corporation
illustrates the paucity of foreign holdings owned by developing country governments. Mikhail Melnik, Crew Leaves
Ukrainian Jumbo Plane Arrested in Belgium, ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 22, 2004
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A successful program linking primary health care provision and natural resource
exploitation could have a very significant impact. Adhering to guidelines previously agreed to,
natural resource companies would make a significant commitment to expanding primary health
care opportunities in the developing countries they invested in. These resources would be
invested with a minimum of corruption and inefficiency in order to protect the private
corporation’s profits. The government of the country would also have incentives to cooperate,
out of concern for its citizens welfare but also in order to promote good relations with the
corporation responsible for producing much of the income used for the government’s own
activities.108

Eventually the primary health care investment would result in significantly

improved health for the entire population. Failing to meet targets would carry sufficiently
significant financial consequences that the company concerned would not permit shortfalls
because of bureaucracy, lack of resources or a desire to make short term cost savings. Better
primary health care would improve not just the overall well being of the general population but
also aid general economic development, as the workforce became less prone to disease and could
participate in additional wealth generating activities.109
In order for the program discussed above to be successfully implemented, international
financial institutions will need to link their participation in natural resource development projects
with the assumption of primary health care responsibility by natural resource companies. As
discussed earlier, primary health care is a sector where investment is very important but all too
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This is a key reason for requiring the corporation to undertake responsibility for achieving specific targets, rather
than simply requiring payments to a third party. Ideally, the corporation will use the influence it possesses as a
major contributor to government revenues in order to achieve the targets it has committed to meet.
109
The ideas sketched in this section obviously face significant practical challenges—these are addressed in Section
VI.
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often not successfully implemented. It is also relatively removed from cultural sensitivities,110 at
least in comparison to sectors like education.111 Primary health care is thus an ideal sector within
which to develop the program discussed above.
International financial institutions whose funding is required to permit natural resource
projects to go forward would need to consider three core issues when making natural resource
companies responsible for aspects of primary health care in a developing country: Goal setting,
Monitoring and Enforcement.

Addressing these issues will ensure that natural resources

companies are set appropriate targets, meet them and are subject to rewards and penalties that
deter failure to provide services.
A successful coordination of goal setting, monitoring and enforcement would improve
links between natural resource exploitation and public welfare in developing countries.112 The
same profit incentive that makes private companies efficient at exploiting natural resources
would be applied to the provision of primary health.113 The influence that natural resource
companies derive as wealth generators for government elites would also help ensure the success
of their endeavors. Eventually, if links to primary health care provision proved successful,
110

As stated this is a relative issue—problems like Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and some other health
provision issues are still very controversial. But compared to the core nation building an attitude functions of
education, these are less controversial.
111
National identity and consciousness are more explicitly linked with particular school curricula than with the
provision of basic health services. While views on history can vary widely, basic medical procedures vary less and
are less influential in shaping national consciousness. Traditional medicine and other national symbols may increase
national consciousness, but it is unlikely that traditional medical culture would be incompatible with child
inoculation and other procedures crucial to basic primary health care. Finally, any goal setting process would set
specific goals that were appropriate to country conditions—this could include consideration of any local health care
traditions important to national identity.
112
International financial institutions already have experience in setting and monitoring targets for complex projects.
See, e.g., Wayne Arnold, Indonesia Vows to Pursue Economic Plan, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at W7. To
assist them, numerous consultancies have developed expertise in assessing private company’s performance against
social, community development environmental criteria. See, e.g., Shell Nigeria, supra note 60, at 28.
113
The idea that non-financial obligations would be forced onto natural resource companies is also not unusual.
Project finance agreements increasingly specify that companies will meet environmental and social standards set by
international financial institutions. See, e.g., John W. Head, For Richer or for Poorer: Assessing the Criticisms
Directed at the Multilateral Development Banks, 52 Kan. L. Rev. 241, 280 (2004); Demetri Sevastopulos, Four
Banks Adopt IFC Agreement, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 7, 2003, at 17.
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developing countries and international donors could consider bringing the same model to other
government activities.114

b. Goal Setting
Setting challenging but achievable performance targets is crucial to ensuring that natural
resource companies positively impact primary health care in developing countries. International
financial institutions that sponsor this program will have to create processes to set targets that
natural resource companies are responsible for meeting. This process should include wide
consultations with numerous partners and aim to set achievable but challenging goals. Crucial to
the program’s success will be avoiding excessive lobbying by natural resource companies and
their representatives. Any goals that are set will also need to avoid interfering or drawing
support from other necessary social programs.
Any goal setting process will need to include consultations with and representatives from
numerous constituencies.

The consultations can include both information sharing and

participation in the actual goal setting process. These consultations can both leverage existing
knowledge/ideas and create a feeling of shared ownership over the program. Core constituencies
that will definitely need to be consulted include representatives of the natural resource
companies concerned, the developing country government, large donors to the government,
international NGOs and domestic civil society institutions.115 The latter might include domestic
NGOs, academic and journalists.116 These groups will need to decide the types of targets that
114

This assumption of responsibility might raise even greater normative concerns than the current proposal, and
would need to be considered separately.
115
While the Chad pipeline project conducted significant public consultations, these were marred by accusations that
presentations were one sided. See Uriz, supra note 13, at 220. Consultations and discussions would need to be
planned in conjunction with multiple civil society organizations.
116
Local level consultations (as opposed to information sessions) may be difficult to achieve. Communicating
complicated ideas via video or text can be challenging, see Uriz, supra note 13, at 220-21. Even simple security
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must be met, and whether they consist solely of inputs (e.g. number of children immunized) or of
outputs as well (e.g. child death rate).117
The most substantial part of the goal setting process will be choosing appropriate targets
for extending primary health care. It is vital that this process include input from the private
sector corporations potentially responsible for implementing the plans (input would probably be
solicited from all companies interested in bidding for a particular project).

These private

corporations will help determine what targets might be impossible to actually achieve.118 To
balance these cautionary views, local and international NGOs and other local civil society
representatives, along with government officials can indicate their ideal in terms of increasing
primary health care services. The international financial institution coordinating the project can
serve as a moderator, collecting proposals.

Eventually, a pre-set committee, composed of

academics, development experts and officials from the financial institution can decide on the
performance targets that will accompany any loans. Prior coordination with natural resource
companies should ensure that they accept these terms and take part in the project.
The committee that decides on goals for improvement in primary health care can also be
responsible for additional aspects of the project—e.g. the percentage of income normally
allocated to the government which will be forfeited to help pay for the primary health care
programs run the by the natural resource company. All of these targets will be individualized for
measures like security guards can complicate message delivery, Id., and village level meetings may subject
individuals to social pressure for speaking freely. Carefully chosen, local civil society partners may be more
appropriate for gauging popular opinion.
117
Input targets will be easier to measure but are not immediately linked with concrete results. Output targets will
be more difficult to tie directly to the efforts of natural resource companies. In the consultation process described
below, the full merits of choosing between these types of targets can be explored. It is likely however that
companies will resist any output targets, arguing that intervening events could undermine their best efforts. In this
case, it will be incumbent on the committee to propose input targets that are clearly linked to improved public
health.
118
While providing full developed country health care levels everywhere would be ideal, this program’s limitation is
that overambitious targets will simply not be accepted by natural resource companies and will thus not be
implemented. More modest but actually realizable goals will thus be necessary.
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each developing country considered, depending on the size of the project being funded and
particular country conditions.
In setting targets and engaging in consultations, the committee will need to avoid
excessive attempts to lobby for particular results. Natural resources companies can be expected
to mobilize lobbyists to advocate for less challenging targets.119

They may also co-opt

representatives from the developing country’s civil society and its government.120 Additionally,
government and NGO representatives may try to exert public pressure for over-ambitious targets.
In designing a goal setting process, specific rules on lobbying will need to be drawn up, with
sanctions for excessive or dishonest attempts to influence committee members.

But these

regulations can only be expected to address part of the problem. Committee members, and the
international financial institutions sponsoring them, will need to remain vigilant about attempts
to influence their decision.
A crucial challenge for the committee will involve setting targets that influence
appropriate behavior. Target setting for public services has had a mixed record in developed
countries,121 and has in some cases let to behavior with negative social utility. Appropriate
targets will measure both quantity and quality of services provided. They will also be set taking
into account other programs that are underway in the developing country. To the greatest extent
possible, the committee setting these targets should try not to undermine existing social
programs.
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Oil companies can mobilize teams of experts, coalitions and political allies to advocate legal changes they
support. See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Clashing Opinions at Meeting on Alaska Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2001,
at A15.
120
Oil companies do this in developed countries as well, see id.
121
See, e.g., Tash Shifrin, Government Promises Targets Shakeup, GUARDIAN, Nov. 11, 2003, available at
http://society.guardian.co.uk/futureforpublicservices/story/0,8150,1082712,00.html.
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Target setting, even with input from a broad cross-section of concerned actors, runs the
real risk of reducing efforts in other areas. In the case of the natural resource companies
concerned, it is almost certain that other social programs may be curtailed—this would be a
natural consequence of the program’s focus on primary health care. During consultations on
target setting, concerned actors would be able to highlight the potential that particular, valuable
social programs would be harmed by the targets set. The committee setting these targets would
then be able to evaluate these concerns and, when necessary, alter the targets.
c. Monitoring Activities
Monitoring the success of natural resource companies’ provision of primary health care will
be crucial to assuring the success of this plan. Successful monitoring will consider both the
quality and quantity of health services provided, assisting with assessments of what progress has
been made in meeting the targets agreed in the goal setting process. This will enable the
assignment of rewards or sanctions to the natural resources company responsible. It could also
allow feedback on ways that the goals might need to be changed. Monitoring activities also
provide an opportunity to make civil society actors meaningful partners in the project, helping to
improve their cooperation with overall project goals. Material incentives may be a useful way of
encouraging NGOs and other civil society representatives to participate in monitoring.
Successful monitoring activity is predicated on appropriate goal setting. At least some of
the targets set in this phase should be tied to easily measured performance indicators. But targets
need not all be quantitative and monitoring reports should not be universally tied to particular
performance criteria. Instead, a mix of qualitative and quantitative reports, some focusing on
specific criteria and some not will yield the most appropriate results.
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Quantitative monitoring in response to particular targets is most easily imagined and will be
very useful. This type of monitoring might include statistics on the percentage of children
receiving vaccinations, the number of primary care facilities, the number of people treated in
primary health facilities, the percentage of deaths in childbirth, and other relevant statistics.122
Monitoring this type of data will be relatively simple—it is often already collected, though there
are significant opportunities for improving data collection in particular developing countries.123
These statistics can also provide general information on the levels of investment natural resource
companies are making and on the overall health impact this investment is having.
Qualitative monitoring will also be important, both independently and in response to
particular targets. These types of reports can include information on particular innovations that
are being made, popular reaction to the increase in primary health care, and the means that
natural resource companies use to achieve any quantitative targets that they set. Qualitative
reporting requirements also provide ideal opportunities for integrating NGOs and other civil
society representatives. These types of reports allow local representatives increased freedom to
shape the structure of their reports around the particular concerns they are identifying. Certain
qualitative reports might even be procured with no pre-set requirements, but rather a request for
an overall assessment. These will be an ideal context with which to understand more focused
qualitative and quantitative data.
Utilizing a large number of monitoring mechanisms is crucial because the data will be used
to decided significant financial rewards and penalties. The large financial import of the data
makes it particularly important that information collected is accurate. Using a large number of
122

This selection of goals deliberately includes potential input and output targets. As discussed earlier, corporations
may insist that only input targets be used.
123
See, e.g., HDI Report, supra note 6 at 208-17; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO & UNICEF ESTIMATES
OF NATIONAL IMMUNIZATION COVERAGE (2004), at http://www.who.int/vaccinessurveillance/WHOUNICEF_Coverage_Review/.
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information gathering mechanisms will allow double checking of reports’ accuracy. It will also
reduce the ability of interested actors to influence the content of monitoring in ways that they
find financially beneficial.

These potential wrongdoers could include not only the natural

resource companies responsible for the provision of health care but potentially their financial
competitors and/or governments seeking to obtain additional investment in their health care
networks.
Monitoring will certainly need to include collection of official health care statistics and
dedicated teams affiliated with international institutions sponsoring the project. But involving
local and international civil society institutions would significantly increase the number of
monitoring mechanisms, as well as giving affected communities (e.g. international development
professionals, domestic civil society members, and others) a sense of ownership over the project.
Official teams from the financial institution monitoring the project will be able to tailor their
activities to the needs of the actual project. Because monitoring will be one of their core
activities, they will be able to collect specific data needed to measure progress towards meeting
previously agreed goals. They will also be an independent voice and relatively impervious to
pressure from interested parties like natural resource companies and host governments. These
monitoring teams will form the base of the monitoring effort.
International development NGOs’ assistance with monitoring activities will provide valuable
alternative perspectives.

Many international development NGOs are skeptical of natural

resource companies and international financial institutions.124 Their alternative perspectives will
provide a good balance to the views of official teams, who while independent of outside actors,
may be affected by their institutions’ sponsorship of the project.

Involving international
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See, e.g., OXFAM, THE IMF AND THE MILLENIUM GOALS: FAILING TO DELIVER FOR LOW INCOME COUNTRIES
(2003); CHRISTIAN AID, FUELLING POVERTY: OIL, WAR AND CORRUPTION (2003).
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development NGOs might also provide them with a greater sense of project ownership. This
could encourage constructive engagement with criticisms, rather than media campaigns that
could undermine the entire project’s success.
Domestic civil society representatives are the third prong of a successful monitoring effort.
Involving local NGOs, media, government officials and others in the project will help ensure that
local perspectives are adequately represented. Domestic civil society institutions will have local
connections and insights that official teams and international NGOs may lack. Some of these
groups’ members will directly experience the primary health care provided through oil revenues,
a perspective that other monitors will not share. Giving domestic civil society groups a sense of
ownership in the project will also reduce nationalistic protests. Providing real opportunities for
all sectors of society, including the government, to see the new services for themselves might
also reduce suspicions that the project is undertaken to benefit any particular group in society—
e.g. the government or opposition parties.
Data collected by monitors does not have to be used exclusively to determine sanctions and
rewards for the natural resource company concerned. The reports may also provide evidence of
particular approaches to primary health care that should be replicated in other societies. They
may also be used in constructive dialogue with the responsible natural resource company.
Encouraging monitors and those they monitor to discuss their findings could lead to useful group
problem solving and even partnerships to address particular roadblocks. This type of activity
could also reduce strains in relationships that monitoring could introduce in the developing
country. An eventual goal of the monitoring program should be for civil society monitors to
involve themselves more in facilitating development—both alone and in conjunction with those
they are monitoring.
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d. Enforcement
Enforcement mechanisms will motivate natural resources companies to comply with preagreed goals. Preferably, enforcement mechanisms will combine a system of inducements with a
penalty system. Whatever system is designed will need to be significant enough to influence
resource allocation decisions of the companies concerned. In order to reassure all parties to the
process, the enforcement system will need to be administered by an independent Board whose
decisions can then be appealed.

This Board will assess criteria previously agreed to by all

parties, collected by the international financial institution concerned and, in the case of penalties,
enforced through western court systems. The Board will also need to consider situations where
goals were not achieved for reasons beyond the control of natural resource companies—as
specified in loan agreements with international resource companies.
1. Enforcement Procedures
An independent Board constituted according to preset procedures will be crucial to both
the effectiveness and the legitimacy of any enforcement system. This Board will need to
regularly assess progress against previously agreed criteria set out in project agreements between
these companies and international financial institutions. It will then need to decide on what
inducements or penalties are appropriate. The decisions of the Board will need to be both public
and open to appeal by both international financial institutions and the natural resource
companies.
The rules of procedure for the Board (and, relatedly, its membership) which monitors
these contracts will need to be drafted with care. Some of these rules can be derived from
existing codes like those drafted for international arbitration by organizations like the
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International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)125 and the the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).126 Others will need to be
specifically crafted to ensure that the Board is independent and focused on regularly measuring
progress in the implementation of primary health care (as opposed to rendering isolated
decisions).

Additionally, unlike international arbitrators (who generally change for every

arbitration), the Board’s membership will be relatively unchanging, with members serving for
fixed time periods.
Given the Board’s mission to regularly measure progress in meeting primary health care
commitments, it will need to develop a speedy process for considering evidence while still
giving a fair hearing to the reports of very diverse parties. To accomplish this, rules of document
submission for all parties will need to be strict, with early deadlines and responses to specific
data requests by the Board. NGOs’, especially ones from the country concerned, may be given
additional leeway in order to accommodate their more limited resources and the importance of
creating a feeling of ownership over the natural resources project. Representatives of the natural
resources companies and other entities will also need to be available for conversations with the
Board about the information it is considering.
Depending on the particular loan agreement, the particular targets and types of progress
the Board measures will adjust from case to case, and it will need to accept evidence and
information from a very wide variety of parties, including national governments, national and
international lenders and NGOs. The Board will be particularly useful in the event of mixed
progress against key benchmarks (e.g. exceeding some but falling short on others). In this case,
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See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
AND RULES, available at www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm

ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS
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See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17,
Annex I, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985); 24 I.L.M. 1302.
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even with the clearest benchmarks possible, a balancing will need to take place, and an
independent Board is more likely to be trusted by the concerned parties than a simple committee
formed by the lenders. In the long term, the Board would also be able to recommend on whether
goals and/or inducements/penalties should be restructured to more accurately reflect
circumstances encountered by the natural resource company.
In order for the enforcement mechanism and the Board to be successful, it will be
important to obtain strong consensus when particular inducements/penalties are linked to specific
goals. These inducements/penalties are not meant to be independent revenue generators but
rather mechanisms that influence compliance with pre-set targets. Additionally, the enforcement
mechanism should be easy to implement—to reduce both the possibility of natural resource
companies “gaming the system” and to give the appearance of transparency, which will be
important for the program’s overall credibility. This suggests that any enforcement system
should be almost wholly financial in impact.
During the goal setting process, careful thought must be given to the exact mix of
enforcement techniques that are appropriate for a particular lending project. Factors that might
need to be taken into account include the rigor of the goals agreed to, the types of enforcement
procedures that a natural resource company will agree to be subjected to in order to participate in
the project, and the impact that particular enforcement measures will have on the natural
resource company involved. The ultimate goal will always be to ensure that the company meets
or exceeds challenging goals in the provision of primary health care. This will require balancing
the rigor of the goals and the magnitude of inducements/penalties.
A final consideration when setting up a Board is that its decisions can both be submitted
to speedy international arbitration and that they are enforceable in national courts.

Loan
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agreements should set out a clear set of criteria under which decisions of the Board’s decisions
will be subject to an arbitration process.

These should allow for speedy consideration of

evidence and decisions. This option to appeal may increase the confidence of natural resource
companies in the process and thus their willingness to participate. Concomitantly though, the
legal framework in any loan agreement should clearly provide for a right to recovery in multiple
national jurisdictions for any financial penalties. This will be different from standard contract
clauses allowing lenders to demand immediate repayment under particular conditions. Instead, it
will usually demand a penalty for not having met targets but proceed on the assumption the
primary health care program will continue under the aegis of the natural resource company,
unless there is an absolute failure to meet primary health care targets.
The Board should be open to submissions by NGOs, host governments and other third
parties. But appeals from its decisions should be allowed only by the specific lenders and
borrowers. This will provide some security to natural resource companies worried that activist
NGOs or host governments may decide to try and enforce tougher standards than those
previously agreed to. More broadly, the Board itself should be the same for all loan contracts
completed under this framework. Though the exact conditions for the loan may differ, having a
consistent membership and set of procedures for the evaluating Board will make the process
more predictable and the responsibilities of natural resource companies clearer.

2. Inducements
Inducements will be relatively uncomplicated and primarily provided by the international
financial institutions sponsoring the project.

These inducements will be mostly financial,

including reduced interest payments, extended repayment periods and/or other financial rewards.
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The exact triggers for award of these inducements will apply will be determined the goal setting
section. But it would be reasonable to expect these if natural resource companies over deliver on
key primary health care targets.
Additional incentives for good performance on pre-assigned targets will include positive
press coverage and may extend to preferential consideration for future projects by both the
developing country government and the international financial institution. Natural resource
companies which are financially rewarded for improving primary health care will be able to use
this award in their public relations campaigns and as proof of the positive impact they have on
the developing world. This could be an extremely valuable fringe-benefit to the purely financial
incentives.127 It is also likely that good performance in providing primary health care will yield
additional opportunities for cooperation with the international financial institution and
developing country governments. These opportunities could be formally codified as additional
incentives. But even if not officially provided, a publicized positive track record in this regard
will almost inevitably make it easier to obtain additional contracts.

3. Penalties
Penalties for failing to meet pre-set targets will be more complex to implement than
inducements. In some cases, they may not be appropriate at all because of the inherent tension
and legal complexities they give rise to. But if they are necessary, a number of additional
considerations will have to be taken into account. The supervising Board will need to calculate
these penalties in an open, previously agreed and transparent way.

International Financial

Institutions will then need to collect these awards, possibly using developed world legal systems
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Oil companies like Shell have demonstrated how important they feel this type of publicity is by issuing auditor
approved reports on their ethical and environmental behavior. See SHELL REPORT, supra note 65.
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to enforce judgments against the companies concerned. The possibility of open legal battles over
penalties will encourage natural resource companies to comply with any judgments against them
to avoid reinforcing public relations problems.
As with inducements, the process of setting penalties will need to be previously agreed in
order to avoid giving rise to disputes. Because of the large financial and public relations impact
these penalties can have, natural resource companies can be expected to lobby heavily against
their imposition. This will make it crucial that the procedures used and penalties applied are
very clearly delineated beforehand, and that their application is not subject to widely differing
interpretation. The penalties will almost certainly be financial and will depend on the extent to
which pre-agreed targets were not met.
One potentially challenging aspect of any penalty program will be ensuring that any
monetary awards are collected. It will be crucial to ensure that any contracts signed can be
enforced by national courts in countries where natural resource companies have assets that can
be impounded. Any court ruling exempting natural resource companies from penalties will
seriously undermine incentives to comply with previously agreed targets in primary health care
provision. Assuring adequate courtroom enforcement of penalties will be especially crucial in
the case of natural resource companies based in jurisdictions where the judiciary may not reliably
enforce contracts (e.g. China and other developing countries).128 In the case of companies like
these, enforcement provisions may be less useful or may need to be secured by assets in
countries with more reliable judicial systems.
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See, e.g., Volz supra note 110, at 904.
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Given the increasing acceptance of international arbitration and the enforcement of crossborder contracts,129 it is not unrealistic to expect at least some court systems to fully support
efforts by international financial institutions to collect penalties decided by the Board. The
actual procedure of the Board will be more similar to that of various UN human rights
committees which meet regularly to assess progress towards particular goals by nation states
than to court decisions.130 But styling the Board’s deliberations as the results of international
arbitration may make them seem more familiar and acceptable to national courts.131 Thus, the
loan agreements specifying the existence of the Board and its procedures may need to constitute
it as a pre-authorized arbitration panel—rather than a completely new entity with which
enforcing national courts have no experience. Conveniently, large natural resource companies
often possess far flung holdings in numerous countries—making it easier to enforce the award in
jurisdictions more open to enforcing penalties agreed by international arbitration.132 In this
sense, large natural resource companies are much more vulnerable to international pressure than
governments, as they do not possess ultimate control over a particular geographical area where
most of their resources are concentrated.
A non-legal motivator for natural resources companies’ compliance with penalties for not
meeting pre-set goals are the strong public relations and credibility blows they will suffer
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An example of this was the impounding of a Ukrainian plane, by a Belgian court on the order of a Swedish Court
of Arbitration in a dispute with a Cypriot company. See Melnik, supra note 111.
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The actual deliberations of the UN human rights committees are relatively secretive and time consuming, often
taking years before condemnation and action. See DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS 156-72 (3rd. ed. 2001). While monitoring of natural resources companies would be
more public and action swifter, it would share an emphasis on yearly/continuous monitoring. Additionally, given
the highly specific nature of arbitration agreements, there should be no problems in setting up a Board with
permanent members whose judgments can, in certain cases, be appealed to a more standard international arbitration
panel.
131
Some national courts are still reluctant to enforce international arbitration agreements, see, e.g., Volz, supra note
110 at 870, but these would still be more acceptable than a new and untried international procedure.
132
For example, Belgium is noted for enforcing international arbitration awards, with relatively minimal judicial
control over enforcement of awards. See, id. at 895. Other European Union nations also have a good record
enforcing foreign arbitration awards. See, id. at 894.
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otherwise. This is especially the case for western natural resource companies, whose “clean”
reputation is most developed and valuable. For these companies, failing to meet goals in primary
health care provision will negatively affect public relations. Any court battles against penalties
will increase coverage of their failure and could also reinforce perceptions that they care less
about developing social capital than they claim.133 Additionally, companies that refuse to pay
penalties may suffer official or unofficial penalties when bidding for additional contracts with
international financial institutions or developing country governments (as well as seriously
damaging their public image). These factors should ensure that carefully structured penalty
programs are not continuously challenged in court.
Any Board considering the performance of natural resource companies will need to
consider extenuating circumstances. These can be partially negotiated in advance but the board
will also need to consider unforeseen ones as they arrive. Factors like civil wars and natural
disasters such as earthquakes are obviously beyond natural resources companies’ control.
Boards will need to decide whether these types of events justify deviations from previously
agreed targets and what magnitude this deviation may be. But the powers (and limitations) of
the Board in this case will need to be clearly delineated in the loan agreement, in order to reduce
the ability of natural resource companies to challenge penalties based on open ended definitions
of circumstances beyond their control.
e.Potential Impact
Making natural resources companies responsible for promoting primary health care
development in areas within which they invest will bring significant benefits. Natural resources
companies have demonstrated their ability to achieve their goals in developing countries.134
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For examples of the types of claims that would be undermined, see, e.g., SHELL REPORT, supra note 65.
See discussion in section IV.
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Linking natural resource development with improvements in primary health care is an excellent
way of aligning natural resource companies’ profit making incentives with broader societal
goals.
As discussed in Section III, natural resource companies have significant influence over
developing countries. Their activities are major revenue producers for the government and their
requests are taken extremely seriously. More broadly, natural resource companies can be a
powerful example of best practices for domestic businesses—with their business operations
training business and political elites. The positive—and negative—impact of natural resource
companies’ policies and values on developing country elites is hard to overstate.
Ensuring that primary health care has a significant impact on natural resource companies’
revenues has the potential to affect programs beyond those directly focused on primary health
promotion. Correctly aligned programs may induce natural resource companies to make primary
health care promotion a central component of many activities. Companies will have an incentive
to pressure governments into promoting sensible health care policies that will help them meet
their pre-set targets. Natural resource companies may also be able to mobilize local businesses
to assist it with efforts to promote primary health care programs. Ideally, all employees in
particular developing countries will be encouraged to consider the primary health care impact of
their projects and to assist in promoting particular campaigns/goals. This mobilization of society
would assist in conserving and increasing company profits. But it could also lead to a new focus
on primary health care by wide swaths of developing country elites.
More broadly, international development NGOs and other organizations assisting with
development will also have an incentive to cooperate with natural resources companies
participating in this program. The integral role that the company will be required to take in
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promoting primary health care will require cooperation. NGOs will need to engage the selected
corporation to remain relevant on the issue of primary health care—but the corporation will also
have an incentive to use NGOs’ expertise in primary health care development. This cooperation
between entities that have often had hostile relations in the past could lead to significant learning
opportunities and additional cooperation particular development projects, beyond the specific
country and in sectors other than primary health care.
The goal setting, monitoring and enforcement measures which are developed should take
into account the ability of companies to transform their entire behavior and that of the societies
they interact with. Effort which pour short term resources into programs that meet particular
primary health care goals may be less sustainable that others which focus on company and
society-wide behavior. Appropriately structured goal, monitoring and enforcement efforts will
reward sustainable efforts by natural resource companies.
Section VI: Practical Challenges
The ideas outlined above are an extension of current efforts but are still relatively radical.
Making private sector natural resource companies responsible for meeting core primary care
targets in developing countries could fundamentally alter relationships between international
financial institutions, governments, private sector corporations and civil society actors. Before
even considering this type of plan, some key challenges need to be addressed. These include:
whether natural resource companies are actually equipped to handle primary health provision on
a national level; whether companies, civil society actors and especially developing country
governments will be willing to cooperate with this program; the vulnerability of this program to
cheating by governments or corporations and the enforceability of legal constraints on
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companies. Though it is hard to address all these issues definitively, it seems clear that none are
so compelling as to overturn the rational for this program.
A basic challenge to this proposal is whether natural resource companies will actually
have the capacity to reach challenging targets for improvements in primary care provision on a
national level. Their organizational expertise is in extracting, refining and marketing natural
resources and their experience promoting health care is often limited to their employees and
regions around their key production sites. Some critics would suggest that employing a third
party contractor to undertake a health promotion program and requiring payments to them by the
natural resource company could be a better way of achieving key targets.
Unfortunately, primary health care if often so terrible that basic increases in
efficient/uncorrupt delivery mechanisms would be a giant improvement.

As discussed

previously, certain developing nations’ primary health care spending has a very low impact
because of public sector inefficiency/corruption.135 More broadly, the experience of natural
resource companies in providing social services to regional areas should be very useful when
providing more limited services on a national scale. The companies themselves could contract
with other organizations to provide particular sets of services and would be able to use the most
efficient means of meeting/exceeding the goals that have been set.

The ability of natural

resource companies to radically restructure themselves when the business climate requires it
suggests that this responsibility would not be beyond the companies’ abilities.136

Most

significantly, ensuring that the natural resource companies’ are directly involved in the provision
135

See e.g., Filmer, supra note 8 at 15-19; Gupta, supra note 51.
In the unlikely case of large natural resource companies ceasing operations/otherwise withdrawing from the
project, their health care operations would need to be continued by national governments and/or NGOs.
Theoretically, while the operations would lose the extra clout brought by being run by a large investor, the actual
operations will continue to run under new management, and the revenues from the relevant national resources will
be transferred to the government and/or new owners (potentially the international financial institutions who are
creditors of the natural resource company)—still able to fund the health activities.
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of primary care leverages a key asset they possess: sufficient influence and experience to achieve
targets in environments that have corrupt and inefficient government actors.
A second challenge to this program is the willingness of companies, civil society actors
and governments to participate in the program. Each set of actors has its own agendas, many of
which do not make promoting primary health care in developing countries a high priority. More
broadly, it will take the agreement of a large number of international actors to make this program
work. If any of these actors creates obstacles, the experiment could fail.
A key way of addressing this challenge is taking account of the individual parties’
interests.

As was obvious from the Chad oil pipeline project and the experiences of

multinationals like Shell and BP, it is possible to create an environment in which unlikely parties
find it in their interest to advance social goals not immediately connected to their individual
aims.

Natural resource companies in particular are able to show great flexibility in their

operations if their profits depend on it.

In situations like the Chad oil pipeline, where

international financial institutions’ cooperation is needed in order to achieve specific goals, they
will probably be amenable to cooperating with social programs like primary health care
promotion. Their record of supporting community development elsewhere137 suggests this type
of support is possible for them, especially in a situation that provides for a healthy corporate
profit margin.
Civil society actors are diverse in their interests and motivations. Ensuring that they
cooperate will probably require multiple approaches. But a combination of financial rewards for
assisting with monitoring activities, active consultation and the promise of influence and press
attention will probably be useful tools for both domestic and international NGOs. The broad
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See discussion in section III.
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benefits of primary health care promotion are also close to the mission statements of many
NGOs, who will be particularly likely to participate in the project.
Probably the most difficult actors to convince will be developing country governments.
It is their asset distribution systems that are being questioned by this program, and the program
will reduce the resources under the direct control of the government.

Removing the

opportunities for patronage and power that oil resources provide governments will reduce their
desire to support any natural resource development or cooperate with either international
financial institutions, civil society groups or even private sector natural resource extractors. To
address these problems, it is crucial that developing country governments be given direct control
of a portion of the revenue, which provides an incentive for them to cooperate with the program.
Those revenues allocated to the developing country government may be money wasted, but can
be seen as a facilitation payment to allow more effective promotion of the public good by outside
actors.
Convincing all actors to cooperate is obviously a complicated problem. In situations
where projects can go ahead even without international financial institutions, it may be much
harder to initiate an experiment like the one described.

But, as the Chad pipeline case

demonstrates, there are at least some circumstances in which international financial institutions
hold enough trump cards to convince other actors to take part in the program.
A third challenge to the viability of this program is the vulnerability to cheating by
natural resource companies, national governments or NGOs.

Chad’s breaching of its

international agreements soon after it signed them demonstrates the very real threat that contracts
will not be honored. Natural resource companies and governments may have strong incentives
to reduce spending on primary health care if they can divert these resources to their own ends.
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They may also be tempted to collude with each other, especially once the project has been
completed and international financial institutions can no longer withhold funds for the project.
Setting up effective monitoring systems is the first step in addressing this challenge.
Section V outlines the importance of both dedicated monitoring teams and recruiting civil
society partners to assist with the monitoring process. A core part of the proposal is this realistic
assessment of whether primary health care targets are met.

The variety of monitoring

mechanisms will make it harder for natural resources companies to skew results in their favor. A
mix of qualitative and quantitative goals, and the subjective assessment of a committee of
experts will also help prevent efforts to respect the letter of the targets while ignoring their spirit.
National governments will also have a strong incentive to allow primary care provision to go
ahead unimpeded, if only because this could improve their own popularity with voters.
Governments who want to favor some regions or punish others may be dissuaded by pressure
from natural resource companies, which may face sanctions for uneven development.
A particularly challenging problem will develop if the government and natural resource
companies collude to skew reporting and divert funds away from primary health care.
Governments can reduce the ability of civil society representatives to report on targets through
repressive measures, especially if natural resource companies cooperate. In this case, the formal
monitoring teams discussed in Section IV will be extremely important, as will the sanctions
assessed if this collusion is discovered. Any natural resource company that participates in this
kind of collusion will need to given exemplary punishment, with heavy fines, significant bad
publicity and a potential ban on future cooperation with international financial institutions. Even
these types of measures may not totally prevent cheating.

But thoughtful goal setting,

monitoring and assessment should be able to significantly reduce the scope for cheating.
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Beyond the specific parameters of this program, any corrupt actions taken by
corporations could lead to significant consequences because of regulations in anti-corruption
frameworks like the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the OECD convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.138
Engaging in corrupt actions to evade the primary health care requirements could bring heavy
penalties beyond the confines of this program.
The existence of the FCPA and OECD frameworks may also dissuade companies from
engaging in corrupt behavior in order to achieve (as opposed to evading) the health care goals.
There is the potential that natural resource companies would sanction the bribing of government
officials to cooperate with health care programs designed to meet previously agreed targets.
While less troubling than bribing to avoid targets,139 any encouragement to additional corruption
in developing countries would constitute a significant negative impact of the program. The
FCPA allows facilitation payments to promote expedited government action,140 and it is exactly
these types of bribes that might increase as a natural resource company sought to achieve pre-set
targets. But these payments have generally been limited to less than $1000 in practice,141 and
any large deviations from this would probably be declared illegal.142 Given the law and the
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See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-23, 91 Stat. 1494, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-2, 78ff (1994)), amended by International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of
1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff (West Supp. 1999); Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 337 I.L.M. 8. The OECD convention has been
signed by all OECD countries, covering all the major developing countries where most natural resource companies
would be based. See Walter Perkel, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 683, 684 n.6 (2003).
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being equal.
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relatively extensive monitoring of this project as discussed in Section V, it would be foolhardy
for natural resource companies to go beyond the allowed facilitation payments.
Another type of collusion that could cause concern is the effective “buying” of NGOs.
This would involve natural resource companies bribing local NGOs engaged in monitoring
programs to produce positive reports about their activities. This type of collusion would escape
sanction under the FCPA and OECD frameworks, as they deal with the bribing of government
officials rather than NGO officials.143 In cases like this, international financial institutions would
need to rely on the diversity of reporting sources (including international NGOs and local
governments). Additionally, if this type of cheating appears to be significant, it will be possible
for international financial institutions to dispatch additional independent monitors who can check
the information submitted by local NGOs. Those that are found unreliable can be dropped from
the program. As in the case where government officials are bribed, corporations that engaged in
these types of payments would need to be sanctioned in an exemplary fashion.
A second set of challenges may develop after the project is completed. The government
will have the facilities to allow income generation independent of loans/grants from developed
nations and international financial institutions. Though the natural resources company will still
be able to influence the government and will still be vulnerable to punishments, the government
could theoretically nationalize the assets concerned and ignore the international community. But
given the size of the assets concerned, this type of action would have repercussions far beyond
simple primary care provision. The nationalization would create significant new problems for
the government concerned and would be taken up by the broader international community.
While this might not guarantee primary health care provision, the broad negative consequences
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of nationalizations would dissuade most developing country governments from reverting to
them.144
The challenges discussed above are only some of those that this program would face if it
were to be implemented. But they form some of the key questions that need to be answered. As
discussed above, none are compelling enough to stop the program being implemented. Instead,
they raise points to be discussed more fully in any goal setting stage, where targets and
incentives would be structured to take into account these types of concerns.
Section VII: Conclusion
The proposal outlined in Part V could have radical consequences for the relationships of
governments, the private sector, civil society and International Organizations. The potential
risks—to national sovereignty, target populations and the like—would not be acceptable if all
developing country populations were receiving even fair primary health care provision. But the
frequent, abject failure of developing country governments to provide key social services like
primary health care to their people make radical steps like the ones proposed in this program
acceptable. If this experiment succeeds, it could open the way for significant improvements in
the way that a variety of core services are now provided to developing country populations.
The key impetus for the proposal in Section V is the growing appreciation of the
international community that developing country governments have regularly failed to mobilize
natural resources wealth to benefit their general populations. Some commentators have even
viewed natural resources as a “curse”145 and suggested that countries without these resources are
better off. This proposal does not deal with all the negative consequences that natural resource
144

An additional point to make about the threat of nationalization is that governments’ ability to exercise this option
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wealth brings with it, but in improving the efficiency and equity of their distribution does reduce
the possibility of conflict over unfair/privileged enjoyment of core revenue streams.

The

proposal incorporates the international community’s growing appreciation for the efficiencies of
private enterprise and extends current experiments in using the private sector. The efficiency of
private sector corporations can be harnessed by innovative legal agreements and the opportunity
to enforce these agreements worldwide, evading the problems posed by less-developed countries
legal systems.

Though radical, this approach is not completely out of step with current

initiatives—instead it reflects and builds on the experience of current experiments like the Chad
oil pipeline.
The approach discussed may not work in all situations. It is best suited to those situations
where international financial institutions’ contributions are essential to the project’s going
forward—and especially when developing country governments have few alternative resources
to exploit. But these are exactly the situations where primary health care provision is often at its
worst, and where the benefits of outside provision may be most keenly felt. The circumstances
in which this program would most likely be accepted are fortuitously those where it would be
most needed.
If this proposal did succeed in significantly improving access to primary health care,
there would be scope for expanding its application. Other core social services, like primary
education, might also benefit from private sector involvement. While this would pose different
challenges than the provision of primary health care, it could be the beginning of an even more
radical experiment in assuring that citizens of resource rich countries are provided core
prerequisites for social and economic development. Changing natural resources from a “curse”
into a real benefit would be a revolution in international affairs worth supporting.
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